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Note: Korean War Casualties, 1950-1957. Data Source, Korean War Veterans Honor Roll. From the American Battle Monuments Commission. Name: Harold S Chapman Service ID: 14315624 Birth Date: 1930 Race: White Home State: Alabama Casualty Date: 1 Sep 1950 Casualty Country: South Korea Casualty Type: Killed in Action Component: USA - RA (Reg Army) Rank: Corporal Pay Grade: Corporal Organization: Cv Div Inf - 1st Element Sequence: Cv Div Cav Regt Inf Unit #: 0007 Service Occupation: Light Weapons Infantryman
A member of Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Based in Fort Hood, Texas. Was awarded the Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman's Badge, Korean Service Medal, United Nations Service Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Korean Presidential Unit Citation and the Republic of Korea War Service Medal.
United States 7th Cavalry Regiment is a United States Army cavalry regiment, whose lineage traces back to the mid-19th century. Its official nickname is "Garry Owen", in honor of the Irish drinking song Garryowen that was adopted as its march tune.
August 4 - September 15, 1950: Defense of Pusan perimeter. Buildup of ground troops, including U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division; 2nd, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
On July 18, 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division plunged ashore at Pohangdong, South Korea to successfully carry out the first amphibious landing of the Korean conflict. The landing at Pohangdong helped halt the North Korean war machine at the Pusan perimeter. The division broke out of the perimeter in mid-September and started north. Crossing the 38th Parallel on October 9, 1950, the troopers of the 1st Cavalry Division crashed into Pyongyang, capturing the capital city of North Korea on October 19. This marked the third first for the division -- "First in Pyongyang." The sudden intervention of Communist Chinese forces dashed hopes of a quick end to the war. First Team troopers fought courageously in the see-saw campaigns that followed, and successfully defended the city of Seoul. By January 1952, the division, after 18 months of continuous fighting, rotated back to Hokkaido, Japan, returning to Korea in 1957 where they patrolled the Demilitarized Zone until 1965.
The NK seriously began an assault on the Pusan perimeter on August 4. For the next 6 weeks, the issue of whether or not we could hold that perimeter, or would be crushed within it, was in doubt.
When they finally crossed the Naktong and began their violent assault along the entire Perimeter, simultaneously, only 98,000 NK were attacking about 180,000 US and ROK troops. We were well equipped, with 600 main battle tanks against only 100 NK T34s, in excellent defensive positions, supported by far superior artillery, and we had overwhelming air superiority. Yet the NK came within a hair of wiping us out.
The fighting during the first two weeks of this Second Battle of the Naktong was some of the most violent during the Korean War, with proportionately heavy casualties. For instance, about August 24, near Masan, 7500 NK with 25 tanks daringly attacked 20,000 US troops with 100 tanks, and almost broke through for what would have been a cataclysmic bloodbath at Pusan.
In part, this early NK success was owing to the Truman administration having reduced our Army from tough professional soldiers to poorly armed civilians in uniform, fit for garrison duty but completely unprepared for the savagery of combat.
In part, it was because the NK were the reverse. Prepared, veteran, resolute and ferocious.
In part, it was because General MacArthur's Intelligence Section grossly underestimated the casualties inflicted on the NK by the ROKs (estimated 31,000 when in reality the NK had taken 58,000 casualties, to about 76,000 ROK casualties). From the outset, NK conscripted South Koreans into their army, giving the appearance of strength, but these forced recruits had not the years of experience at guerilla warfare possessed by the veteran NK, let alone the will to destroy their own country. This lack of correct military intelligence led to a great over-estimation by Far East Command of NK strength, and a lowered confidence in our front line forces.
The NK continued to menace the perimeter in early September. On September 6, they broke through at Yongchon, forcing ROK headquarters to evacuate Taegu. This time, UN forces bent but they didn't break, and on September 7 General Walton Walker finally proclaimed "Our lines will hold".
When the 5th Marines, a proud regiment of our best fighting men, were withdrawn from his command, General Walker became less confident. The Marines had been consistently effective during the Naktong Bulge fighting. They usually had won their battles with the NK while Army units usually had not, and often about half of Army casualties were MIAs while the Marines usually had none.
But by early September the Army had been able to bring in its better trained infantry units from Hawaii and elsewhere, and was steadily improving in overall combat efficiency.
* North Korean Communist forces appeared to be near complete victory at the end of August and during the first part of September of 1950. Along the southern coast of Korea enemy troops were within thirty miles of Pusan, the only port and supply base left to the United Nations army. American troops holding this Pusan perimeter at the time consisted of four divisions and a brigade occupying a line in the general area of the Naktong River from Waegwan south to Masan-a straight-line distance of seventy miles. The irregular front line was twice that long. South Korean soldiers manned the northern section of the perimeter from Waegwan to Pohang-dong on the east coast.
At the beginning of September the North Koreans began a powerful drive against the southern end of the perimeter defended by the U.S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions. These attacks achieved limited success and carried the combat into the rear areas behind the American front lines. One penetration fell against the 35th Infantry, a regiment of the 25th Division, soon after midnight on the morning of 3 September. The enemy pushed Company B from its position, surrounded Company G and the 1st Battalion command post, and then attacked several batteries of artillery. Among the artillery units, the heaviest fighting took place within the gun position of Battery A, 64th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the 35th Infantry. The headquarters of each of these units was located in Haman at that time.
The US 1st Cavalry Division consists of the following elements:
* Brigade-sized elements o 1st Brigade, "Iron Horse" + 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry + 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry + 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry (Armor) o 2nd Brigade, "Blackjack" + 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (Mechanized) + 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (Armor) + 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry (Armor) o 3rd Brigade, "Grey Wolf" + 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry + 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry + 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry o 4th Brigade (Aviation) + 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Armor) + 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment + 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment + 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment o Engineer Brigade + 8th Engineer Battalion + 20th Engineer Battalion + 91st Engineer Battalion o Division Artillery (DIVARTY) + 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery + 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery + 3rd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery + 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery + 26th Field Artillery + 68th Chemical Company (NBC Defense) o Division Support Command (DISCOM) * Other Elements o 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery o 13th Signal Battalion o 312th Military Intelligence Battalion o 68th Chemical Company o 545th Military Police Company o Reserve Unit + 489th Engineer Bn Combat Corps Mechanized, North Little Rock, AR o National Guard Units: + 724th Engineer Battalion Combat Corps (Wheeled), Superior, WI + 212th Corps Area Sig Bn (Mobile Subs Equip), N Little Rock, AR + 852nd HQ Corps ROAC, Tucson, AZ
Hill 518Eighth United States Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to attack north on September 1 in an effort to divert some of the North Korean strength from the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions in the south.[22] Gay's initial decision upon receipt of this order was to attack north up the Sangju road, but his staff and regimental commanders all joined in urging that the attack instead be against Hill 518 in the US 7th Cavalry zone. Only two days before, Hill 518 had been in the ROK 1st Division zone and had been considered a North Korean assembly point. The US 1st Cavalry Division, accordingly, prepared for an attack in the 7th Cavalry sector and for diversionary attacks by two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on the 7th Cavalry's right flank. This left the 8th Cavalry only one infantry company in reserve. The regiment's 1st Battalion was on the hill mass to the west of the Bowling Alley and north of Tabu-dong; its 2nd Battalion was astride the road.[21] This planned attack against Hill 518 coincided with the defection of NK Major Kim Song Jun of the NK 19th Regiment, NK 13th Division. He reported that a full-scale North Korean attack was to begin at dusk that day. The NK 13th Division, he said, had just taken in 4,000 replacements, 2,000 of them without weapons, and was now back to a strength of approximately 9,000 men. Upon receiving this intelligence, Gay alerted all front-line units to be prepared for the attack.[21] Complying with Eighth Army's order for a spoiling attack against the North Koreans northwest of Taegu, Gay ordered the 7th Cavalry to attack on September 2 and seize Hill 518. Hill 518, also called Suam-san, is a large mountain mass 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Waegwan and 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Naktong River. It curves westward from its peak to its westernmost height, Hill 346, from which the ground drops abruptly to the Naktong River.[23] Situated north of the lateral Waegwan-Tabu–dong road, and about midway between the two towns, it was a critical terrain feature dominating the road between the two places. After securing Hill 518, the 7th Cavalry attack was to continue on to Hill 314. Air strikes and artillery preparations were to precede the infantry attack.[24] On the morning of September 2 the US Air Force delivered a 37-minute strike against Hills 518 and 346. The artillery then laid down its concentrations on the hills, and after that the planes came over again with napalm, leaving the heights on fire. Just after 10:00, and immediately after the final napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, US 7th Cavalry, attacked up Hill 518.[24] The heavy air strikes and the artillery preparations had failed to dislodge the North Koreans.[25] From their positions they delivered mortar and machine gun fire on the climbing infantry, stopping the weak, advanced US force short of the crest. In the afternoon the US battalion withdrew from Hill 518 and attacked northeast against Hill 490, from which other North Korean troops had fired in support of the North Koreans on Hill 518.[26] The next day at 12:00, the newly arrived 3rd Battalion resumed the attack against Hill 518 from the south, as did the 1st Battalion the day before, in a column of companies that resolved itself in the end into a column of squads. Again the attack failed. Other attacks failed on September 4. A North Korean forward observer captured on Hill 518 said that 1,200 North Koreans were dug in on the hill and that they had large numbers of mortars and ammunition to hold out.[26]
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